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In early 2014, the Ebola virus began its devasta-tion of West Africa, moving through countries, communities, and families with grim efficiency. Over the next two years, 60 percent of those 
infected with the virus died—more than 11,000 people. A 
brutal killer, Ebola renders its victims delirious and unable 
to cope on their own. 
One of the hardest-hit countries was Sierra Leone, 
which had just 136 doctors for more than 6 million inhab-
itants. Almost immediately, it fell to family and friends to 
act as caregivers. Ebola killed them, too. In the worst-hit 
areas, the virus eliminated entire families. Those who fell 
ill started running off to die alone rather than risk infect-
ing loved ones. Eventually, social gatherings were banned, 
schools were closed, and households were separated. Soci-
ety and the economy ground to a halt. 
The crisis was unprecedented. Since Ebola was first 
detected in 1976, each of the subsequent 27 outbreaks was 
stopped in less than three months—until 2014. Why did this 
outbreak last for two years and kill more than all previous out-
breaks combined? A complete answer has yet to emerge, but 
two factors were critical. First, we lacked know-how. There 
were no preexisting, evidence-based solutions to combat an 
outbreak of this magnitude. Second, the context was per-
nicious. A variety of circumstances, including unprepared 
health systems at the national level and social disintegration, 
compounded the problem and destabilized even the most 
holistic solutions. 
In these types of circumstances, the way we usually scale 
solutions is ineffective. The traditional approach to deliver-
ing interventions at scale starts with the assumption that we 
have reliable solutions and favorable contexts. When this is 
the case, as it sometimes is, we are urged to scale what works 
by efficiently allocating resources to organizations with 
evidence-based solutions. But as the Ebola crisis shows, this 
is not always the case. Many of our most pressing problems 
are the ones we have been unable to solve, perhaps for years, 
for decades, or longer. Most are not crises on par with an 
Ebola outbreak, but fixtures of the status quo. Issues that 
in the development sphere are often called “wicked prob-
lems.” So, how do we scale when we don’t know what works?
TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM
In the absence of reliable solutions, or when new or changing 
contexts reduce the reliability of existing solutions, scaling 
depends on innovation. Innovation encompasses the entire 
path to scale, starting with ideas that hold promise and cul-
minating in impacts that matter. It centers on innovators 
who are connected to systems of diverse actors. It depends 
on a dynamic body of evidence that develops before, dur-
ing, and after scaling. Scaling innovations is justified by 
assessments of risk made by those put at risk, including 
those being served, and implies that trade-offs and values 
are weighed. It entails much more than resource allocation.
We need a broader way of thinking about scaling that 
takes our uncertainty into account and can be applied to 
the full range of contexts in which innovators, impact 
investors, funders, NGOs, social enterprises, and govern-
ments are currently acting. We are witnessing such an 
approach emerging across the Global South. 
Science delivers innovations that can spark social progress. But the common approaches to scaling 
up these innovations are based on commercial endeavors in which the goals are growth, expansion, 
and maximizing profit. The Global South, however, provides a different way forward where the goal is 
scaling for the public good.  
Scaling Science
BY JOHN GARGANI & ROBERT MCLEAN
Illustration by JAKOB HINRICHS
,
Stanford Social Innovation Review / Fall 2017 35
36 Stanford Social Innovation Review / Fall 2017
JOHN GARGANI is founder and president of 
the program design and evaluation consulting 
firm Gargani + Company, Inc., and president of 
the American Evaluation Association. 
ROBERT MCLEAN is senior program 
specialist in the Policy and Evaluation Division 
of the International Development Research 
Centre, an organization established by the 
government of Canada to support research for 
development across the Global South. 
One of the organizations that are involved in combating the Ebola 
virus in West Africa is the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC), a Canadian institution that supports innovations developed 
by natural and social science researchers in the Global South. (One of 
the authors works for IDRC, and the other is a consultant who works 
with it.) Along with many local and international partners, IDRC sup-
ported efforts to combat Ebola—from long-standing support to pub-
lic health innovation in West Africa to rapid response mechanisms, 
including the trial and scale-up of a new vaccine. 
The science behind clinical trials and large-scale vaccination is 
well understood. With some variation, it is the approach to scaling 
championed by organizations such as the Campbell Collaboration, 
What Works Clearinghouse, and 3ie. This approach has merit, yet it 
was not appropriate for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. 
Without turning their backs on clinical trials and other accepted 
approaches to creating and scaling solutions, IDRC and its partners 
worked to end the Ebola crisis in a different way. Their effort is one 
example of an emerging paradigm of scaling that we call “scaling 
science.” This new paradigm is based on a review of IDRC’s work 
that has aimed to advance a scientific or critical approach to scaling. 
The term “scaling science” purposefully embraces two mean-
ings. The first refers to the objective of scaling scientific research 
results to achieve impacts that matter. We define research broadly 
as the starting place of innovation. It is how solutions to stubborn 
problems are generated. From this perspective, researchers are 
innovators, and innovators are researchers. 
The second meaning refers to the development of a systematic, 
principle-based science of scaling that we believe can increase the like-
lihood that innovations will benefit society. The aim is to contribute 
to building a culture of critical thinking on the topic. All approaches 
to scaling should be questioned, tested, refined, and used thought-
fully. We have learned time and time again from innovators in the 
Global South that it is the careful combination of imagination and 
critical thinking that leads to meaningful change.
TRADITIONAL SCALING PARADIGMS
Most of what we understand today about scaling up social change 
has been borrowed from 19th-century industrial expansion, 20th-
century pharmaceutical regulation, and 21st-century technology 
startups. We refer to these as the industrial, pharmaceutical, and 
lean scaling paradigms. While there is much that we can learn from 
these paradigms, they are insufficient for contemporary social inno-
vation. They reflect an old mind-set in which organizations rather 
than impacts are scaled up, scaling is an imperative, bigger is better, 
and the purpose of scaling is commercial success. 
The industrial scaling paradigm is premised on the need to pro-
duce and distribute many standardized physical objects at the lowest 
cost. The key is “operational scale,” and it is achieved by exploiting 
the efficiencies of large-scale manufacturing and distribution. Its 
purpose is to increase market share and, if possible, secure monopoly 
power. Replication, franchising, and train-the-trainer models, com-
mon in the nonprofit sector, are extensions of the industrial paradigm. 
The pharmaceutical scaling paradigm is premised on the need 
to capture the sole rights to an approved innovation. The keys are 
“authority to scale,” in which the government grants an innovator per-
mission to scale up a drug based on phased clinical trials, and “exclu-
sivity of scale,” in which the innovator is empowered through patents 
and trade secrets to deny others the right to scale up the innovation. 
The subsequent challenges of operational scale—the manufacture 
and distribution of a pill, for example—are often trivial in compari-
son. Current approaches to evidence-based programming, favored by 
many governments and foundations, draw heavily on this paradigm. 
The lean scaling paradigm is premised on the need to grow fast in 
a competitive market. The keys are “rapid learning,” quickly iterating 
product designs to understand what markets value, and “resource 
scale,” securing timely funds to exploit what has been learned and 
grow market share. The lean development process—build a mini-
mum viable product, bring it to market, learn rapidly from customer 
behavior, modify the product or pivot, and repeat—drives many of 
today’s leading tech startups. Unlike pharmaceutical companies, these 
innovators do not require authorization to scale, only the support of 
customers and investors, and they often find exclusivity difficult to 
enforce. As with pharmaceuticals, the problems of operational scale 
are usually negligible, especially if the innovators are selling intangible 
goods, such as software as a service. This is the paradigm that social 
entrepreneurs and impact investors are often encouraged to follow.
These three paradigms are strategies for achieving commercial 
success, not social impact. They may, however, provide some guid-
ance for social innovators who want to scale up impacts in certain 
areas. A developer of low-cost irrigation systems adapted for African 
sunflower farmers, for example, may benefit from adopting elements 
of the industrial paradigm in order to expand production. Advo-
cates for changing an environmental protection policy will likely 
benefit from the staged collection of evidence as one does with the 
pharmaceutical paradigm. And an education or e-health software 
innovator may benefit from basing its development process on the 
adaptive and nimble elements of the lean paradigm. 
The old paradigms are not wrong when applied to social impact; 
they are incomplete. A more comprehensive approach would focus 
on an alternative or additional objective—the public good. With the 
scaling science paradigm, we set out to develop a framework that does 
just that. Our hope is that it will encourage innovators to consider 
scaling from a broader perspective, with tools that are inspired by 
the vast and eclectic problem-solving experience of the Global South. 
FOUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SCALING SCIENCE
Scaling operations, revenue, market share, financing, and other 
aspects of an organization’s work are familiar concepts. Scaling in 
these contexts is synonymous with growth, and more is better.  They 
are legitimate organizational purposes. But our interest is in scaling 
social impact. It is not synonymous with growth, and more is not 
always better. From the perspective of scaling science:
Scaling impact is a coordinated effort to achieve a collection of 
impacts at optimal scale that is only undertaken if it is both morally 
justified and warranted by the dynamic evaluation of evidence. 
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regulate it. Had there been no Ebola crisis in West Africa, phased 
clinical trials followed by large-scale vaccination would likely have 
been judged appropriate. In this case, there would have been norms 
and laws regulating how the vaccine was scaled up. As the crisis 
exploded, however, human lives were at stake and the urgency of 
the problem grew. Accordingly, a riskier strategy was accepted. 
Those bearing the impact risk, including medical professionals, 
community groups, and policy makers in West Africa, were the driving 
force behind that decision. There were no fully tested and approved 
Ebola vaccines. So the decision was made to move forward with a 
vaccine that had demonstrated early trial efficacy in Guinea. In addi-
tion, local and international actors devised an innovative strategy of 
inoculation inspired by the approach used to eradicate smallpox in the 
1970s. In this approach, a relatively small number of high-risk people 
(family, friends, and caregivers of known victims) were identified 
using network analysis and vaccinated. In the absence of an Ebola 
outbreak, this strategy would have imposed too much impact risk. 
In the midst of a deadly crisis, the risk was judged to be acceptable.
2. Inclusive Coordination | The second principle of the scaling science 
paradigm is “inclusive coordination,” the idea that innovators must 
develop relationships with those affected by the innovation and those 
that make scale possible. Most of the time, it is beyond the capacity 
of a single innovator or organization to substantially improve a social 
or environmental problem, no matter how bold its scaling objectives. 
Scaling impact depends on the partnership, collaboration, inclusion, 
and competition of many actors. The practical challenge that innova-
tors face is how to coordinate the actions of diverse actors with mul-
tiple agendas and perspectives in a way that advances the public good.
The actors who make scale possible include investors, funders, 
policy makers, government agen-
cies, and customers. Their par-
ticipation attracts considerable 
attention because they control 
financial resources and power. 
There are many models for 
engaging them, and they play a 
critical role. 
Other actors also need to be 
engaged—in particular, those 
affected by the innovation being 
scaled. We have fewer models for 
engaging them successfully, and 
their exclusion typically does not 
jeopardize access to resources. 
Yet, they are best positioned 
to judge whether the impacts 
achieved constitute success. This 
is why decisions about scale—
the what, how, when, where, and 
why—must also include the peo-
ple who are affected. Our review 
of the experiences of those in 
the Global South indicates that 
doing so increases the chances 
that an innovation will scale 
successfully.
Embedded in this definition are four principles: moral justifica-
tion, inclusive coordination, optimal scale, and dynamic evaluation. 
When these principles are not explicitly addressed, the public good 
may be overshadowed by other purposes—in particular, organiza-
tional growth. Scaling science is built on these four guiding prin-
ciples, which are intended to help social innovators navigate the 
path from ideas to impacts.
1. Moral Justification | Scaling is not an imperative. In fact, some-
times it is better not to scale. The first principle, “moral justifica-
tion,” balances the pressure to grow against a responsibility to others. 
Researchers may feel pressure from government, investors, funders, 
and peers to increase the use of their innovation or to grow their 
organization. But in making that decision, innovators also have a 
responsibility to the people affected by their innovation. And part 
of that responsibility is met by the way in which scaling is justified.
Jeffrey Bradach, cofounder and managing partner of Bridge-
span Group, has similarly pointed out the need to justify scaling. 
He suggests that program directors ask, “Is replication reasonable 
and responsible?” and challenges them to base their answer on evi-
dence of effectiveness.1 His is fundamentally a technical question. To 
answer it, program directors interpret the results of prior research 
and evaluation. But how much evidence of what type justifies scal-
ing? Moreover, who decides? 
We suggest asking an alternative question, “How certain must you 
be that your innovation will achieve positive impacts and avoid nega-
tive ones before you scale?” It is a moral question because scale is a 
value-laden objective. To answer it, innovators—and those affected 
by the innovation—need to establish criteria for scaling that are based 
on “acceptable impact risk.”   
The people who are affected 
by an innovation are the ones 
who bear impact risk. They will 
suffer if an innovation fails to 
produce its intended positive 
impacts or unintentionally pro-
duces negative ones. If social 
innovators scale before they 
are adequately certain about the 
impacts of their solution, they 
impose too much impact risk. If 
they scale too cautiously, they 
impose too little. Social innova-
tors should search for an inter-
mediate, acceptable level of risk. 
(See “Three Levels of Impact 
Risk” at right.) Among the fac-
tors that help determine what 
may be an acceptable level of risk 
are the urgency of the problem, 
cost of failure, diversity of per-
spectives, availability of com-
peting solutions, and likelihood 
of negative impacts.
Often, scaling must be jus-
tified in the absence of laws or 
professional norms that might 
Three Levels of  
Impact Risk
The decision to scale impact depends on an assessment of whether 
scaling imposes acceptable impact risk on the people who may be 
affected by the program, policy, or product. If an organization decides 
to scale when certainty is low, it may impose too much impact risk. If 
it scales when certainty is high, it may impose too little. Seeking the 
middle ground—acceptable impact risk—governs the speed at which 
























One approach to organizing actors is directed coordination, in 
which organizations and individuals come together, they agree on 
a plan of action, and one or more coordinate implementation. The 
Livestock Vaccine Innovation Fund is an example. It is a partnership 
between IDRC, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and Global 
Affairs Canada to develop, produce, and commercialize innova-
tive vaccines against livestock diseases in sub-Saharan Africa and 
South and Southeast Asia. The fund coordinates the collaboration 
of diverse actors as they identify local needs, develop appropriate 
vaccines, and scale impact through uptake and implementation. 
In the parlance of grantmaking organizations, directed coordina-
tion is often referred to as “collective impact.” 2 Unlike many examples 
of collective impact, the development and scaling of livestock vaccines 
may require the coordinated entrance and exit of different collabora-
tors at different levels of scale. Researchers doing the discovery science 
on vaccine candidates, for example, are rarely the same researchers 
who test vaccine efficacy in the field. Moreover, these researchers are 
even less likely to have the skills for commercializing and distribut-
ing animal vaccines to farmers. The actors playing a role in collective 
impact can change as scaling happens, and this requires a plan that 
incorporates anticipation, reaction, and facilitation.
An alternative approach to coordination is undirected. Here, coor-
dination entails working together to develop organic systems—such 
as networks, markets, and professions—in which the independent 
efforts of many actors become self-organizing. The Community of 
Evaluators South Asia, a regional professional organization, offers a 
powerful example. It has helped develop evaluation systems in govern-
ments, universities, NGOs, and the private sector across eight South 
Asian countries. Their work has contributed to improvements in social 
enterprises in Bangladesh, sanitation programs in India, and the mea-
surement of Gross National Happiness in Bhutan. The Community of 
Evaluators did not plan these outcomes in advance. Rather, they arose 
from the undirected interactions of the members of the organic system.
 During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, local actors and international 
organizations coordinated their efforts. This allowed them to 
quickly scale up the vaccination program and help bring an end to 
the crisis. The combined work of scientists, health workers, and aid 
and humanitarian agencies is truly an impressive feat of collective 
impact. It is unlikely that organizations fighting Ebola would have 
achieved similar success had they made independent decisions. 
After the Ebola outbreak subsided, many of these organizations 
and individuals continued to work together to address the underly-
ing problems of public health that allowed the outbreak to reach the 
heights it did. They work together now to establish health systems 
in which preventive care and crisis response can be self-organizing 
in the future. In this instance, it was necessary to use both directed 
and undirected coordination to achieve sustainable impacts at scale.
3. Optimal Scale | The third principle is the idea that solutions to 
social and environmental problems have an “optimal scale,” and 
rarely is it the maximum. There are trade-offs when scaling that 
typically make an intermediate level of scale the most desirable.
Understanding optimal scale starts with creating clarity about 
what exactly impact at scale is and how it will be measured. In our 
review of Southern innovations, we found that impact at scale is 
pursued well beyond minimalist constructs such as counts of ben-
eficiaries. Other goals, such as improvements to a program’s accessi-
bility for particularly underserved subpopulations or cost-efficiency 
gains, can greatly increase the overall impact of a program. At the 
same time, qualitative aims such as sustainability or satisfaction can 
also deeply improve people’s lives. After all, it is entirely plausible that 
benefit for a population can be greater from doing very well on a small 
scale than doing less well on a large scale—and of course, vice versa. 
Small, slow, and beautiful or big, fast, and flawed—both can have their 
merits and their detriments. Embracing optimality requires being 
strategic about the level of impact we reach for and purposeful about 
its measurement. Aiming for “one million lives saved”—though bold 
imagery for a funder—can instigate unhelpful designs.   
When assessing the level of scale that may be optimal, it is impor-
tant to consider “scaling effects.” When we move innovations from 
ideas to interventions in the real world, the scale of their impact is 
not a constant. As we increase our actions, the change in impact may 
be linear (additive) or nonlinear (multiplicative or exponential). It 
may also change qualitatively, becoming more desirable in type or 
nature. On the other hand, scaling may degrade positive impacts 
(diminishing returns), amplify negative impacts, and displace more 
effective alternatives. The way in which impacts change with scale—
for better and worse, in linear and nonlinear ways, qualitatively and 
quantitatively—can mean the difference between success and failure.
Imagine, for example, if TOMS Shoes were to provide free shoes 
to everyone in a low-income country. The increase in the number of 
shoes provided would be linear, but the impact of the shoes would 
not be. While everyone who was poor and needed free shoes would 
get them, people who didn’t need free shoes would also receive a 
pair, degrading the magnitude and quality of the impact. Moreover, 
providing free shoes to everyone would disrupt the local economy, 
hurting those who make, sell, and repair shoes. Not to mention the 
cultural impact of such meddling.
 As scale increases, it may also change the mechanisms that pro-
duce impact. If we wanted everyone in a community to be protected 
against a disease, we would not need to vaccinate every person. 
This is because of a scaling effect called “herd immunity.” As the 
proportion of vaccinated people increases, the probability that an 
unvaccinated person contracts the disease decreases in a nonlin-
ear way. This is because there are fewer opportunities for healthy 
people to become infected. 
In the case of the Ebola outbreak, herd immunity played a critical 
role. It was the reason why vaccinating only those at the center of the 
social network analysis slowed and eventually stopped the spread of 
the disease. Innovators on the ground understood this scaling effect 
and how it changed the mechanism of impact. They used that knowl-
edge to establish an optimal scale for vaccination and a tailored strat-
egy to deliver it. In other contexts, this level of scale may have been 
considered small. With Ebola, it saved resources, reduced negative side 
effects, and allowed actors to shift their focus to other areas of need.
4. Dynamic Evaluation | Impact evaluations assess the effective-
ness of an innovation at a given level of scale. They assume stable 
cause-and-effect relationships, the kind commonly described by 
logic models and theories of change. In reality, impacts may be-
come stronger or weaker, or qualitatively different, in response to 
a range of actions and scaling effects. To accommodate this, scaling 
science uses the principle of “dynamic evaluation,” understanding 
how impacts change with scale. 
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To understand dynamic evaluation, consider a simple example of 
cause and effect. If you drive a car at a constant low speed (cause), it 
handles in a consistent and predictable fashion (effect). If you acceler-
ate for an extended period of time, the car will begin to handle differ-
ently. This change is the result of scaling. Accelerating may help you 
reach your destination more quickly, or it may result in an accident.
Dynamic evaluation is, in effect, how we manage to drive vehi-
cles at increasing speeds. We use a continuous and adaptive process 
of gathering, assessing, and acting on the signals we pick up from 
around us. It is dynamic because it can require changing approaches, 
frameworks, and theories as we proceed. In a car, if we hear a siren 
to our left, we turn our head and look out an entirely different win-
dow. In dynamic evaluation of scaling efforts, if a new innovation 
comes along that holds more promise, we may slow our scaling or 
change our designs for optimal scale. Dynamic evaluation can be 
viewed as a special case of developmental evaluation.3
The dynamic evaluation of the Ebola vaccine program started 
with a social network analysis. It was used to plan the targeted vac-
cinations. However, social networks were not stable because people 
moved to avoid hot spots and care for loved ones. This had the poten-
tial to reduce the effectiveness of targeted vaccines, so the analysis was 
updated frequently, vaccination strategies shifted with short notice, 
and rates of infection were monitored closely. To gauge whether the 
herd immunity had amplified the program’s impact, evaluators looked 
for decreases in the infection rate that outpaced increases in the vac-
cination rate. These short-term results were used to decide how and 
where to roll out vaccinations. After the crisis subsided, the dynamic 
evaluation continued with more familiar summative evaluations and 
planning efforts to strengthen health systems.  
TOWARD A SCALING THEORY OF CHANGE
To help innovators put these four guiding principles into action, scal-
ing science aims to develop a new approach to creating a theory of 
change (a common component of evaluations and program designs), 
called a “scaling theory of change.” 
A traditional theory of change, which we call a “program theory 
of change,” presents a plausible explanation of how a program is 
expected to achieve impact at a given level of scale. This level of 
impact is expressed as a static construct, often with graduated levels 
of similarly static activities, outputs, and outcomes to demonstrate a 
linear process of change that an innovation will travel to arrive at its 
eventual impact. A scaling theory of change, by contrast, presents a 
plausible explanation of how scaling is expected to change the way 
a program achieves impact as it scales. This is the key feature, and 
what makes a scaling theory of change different. In essence, it aims 
to capture the dynamism of innovation. It is intended to complement, 
not replace, a program theory of change. A scaling theory of change 
has three basic components: a path to scale, a response to scale, and 
partners for scale. 
A “path to scale” is the sequence of stages through which an 
innovation is expected to pass as it scales. Any number of stages 
may be specified and named in a way that is most useful for the 
context. For example, a path may start with generating a promising 
idea that may produce a solution, followed by building the know-how 
to implement the idea, then applying the know-how to take action, 
and lastly expanding action to achieve impact at scale. This general 
path can be adapted to any type of innovation being scaled—for 
example, a policy, product, program, or practice.
Although the stages are sequential, an innovator’s path through 
them rarely is. Advancing from one level to the next requires jus-
tification. Assessments of acceptable risk may result in a decision 
to move up or down one or more levels, or stay at the current level. 
Identifying the critical points where scaling should be justified helps 
ensure that scaling decisions are transparent, are based on relevant 
evidence, and include the people affected by the decisions.
A scaling theory of change also includes an explicit statement of 
how impacts are expected to change as the solution scales, called a 
“response to scale.” These may include changes in the magnitude, 
quality, and type of impacts. In justifying these relationships, potential 
scaling effects should be taken into account. In most cases, an innova-
tion produces a collection of positive and negative impacts, requiring 
judgments about optimality. Creating a visual representation can help 
stakeholders consider the trade-offs and identify an optimal point, or 
arrive at an acceptable compromise if they cannot agree.
The third component of a scaling theory of change identifies “part-
ners for scale,” and it describes the often-intricate arrangement and 
roles of partners involved in scaling up a solution. The principle of 
coordination plays an important role here. There are often two groups 
of partners, one collaborating on research and development, the other 
implementing and scaling the innovation. The work of partners within 
these groups requires coordination. Similarly, handoffs from the one 
group to the next, financial exits of private investors, and other transi-
tions among partners may need coordination. Shifting arrangements 
of partners are unlikely to result in impacts at optimal scale unless 
facilitating organizations or self-organizing systems guide them. 
LOOKING AHEAD
As the experience of the West African Ebola outbreak shows, scal-
ing impact can be tremendously complex. There are typically many 
actors, changing conditions, and limits to our knowledge. This 
complexity can be found in the midst of a crisis and in ordinary, 
everyday life. With scaling science, we try to make the complexity 
of scaling more navigable. We do this by drawing from a vast diver-
sity of experience of Southern innovators. 
One way to think about scaling science is that its principles can 
help innovators create a map to guide their work. We can’t chart 
precise directions for each and every scaling journey. As we travel, 
conditions change, and so too should our route, our speed, our means 
of transport, even our destination. But a map, built from the expe-
rience of others who have crossed the same terrain, can help us to 
plan a journey and evaluate a position.
We encourage innovators to consider what it means for impact to 
scale and how scaling decisions should be made. We invite inspired 
individuals and organizations to contribute to our understanding 
of scaling in general and scaling science in particular. How else can 
we hope to scale the science of scaling? n
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